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"In the past twenty-five years, the United States has had three major
exports: rock music, blue jeans, and United States law. The first two
have acquired an acceptance the last can never achieve."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1977, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of the United
States has prohibited and criminalized the payment of bribes by enu-
merated groups2 to foreign officials.3 Although the particular legislation
as originally passed was subjected to substantial criticism,' Congress
reaffirmed its faith in extraterritorial proscription of bribery by enacting
revisions in 1988 that were intended to eliminate flaws, while main-
taining the essential functions of the statute.5
Confidence in the FCPA's basic philosophy has been registered
globally, in the form of post-Cold War initiatives toward multilateral
adoption of comparable legislation.6 Two influential world organiza-
tions have voiced their specific support over the past few years. In 1996,
member states of the Organization of American States (OAS) resolved
to enact and implement their own versions of the original U.S. proto-
type.7 In the summer of 1998, twenty-nine members of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and five addi-
tional countries committed themselves to the ratification of the
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Inter-
1. V. Rock Grundman, The New Imperialism: The Extraterritorial Application of
United States Law, 14 INT'L LAW. 257, 257 (1980).
2. The groups enumerated include issuers of securities; domestic concerns; and the of-
ficers, directors, employees, agents, and stockholders of issuers of securities and domestic
concerns. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-2 (1982)).
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Irwin Arieff, U.S. Business Groups Back Move to Ease Overseas Bribery
Law, REUTERS N. EUR. SERV., Apr. 20, 1986.
5. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 5001-
03, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415-25 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-2 (1994)).
6. Hotchkiss attributes this movement to four post-Cold War phenomena: the opening
of socialist societies; the flourishing of corruption in the wake of post-socialist collapse of
economic and social structures; the opening of markets; and the attention of policy makers,
investors, and citizens on negative effects of corruption. Carolyn Hotchkiss, Let Sleeping
Dogs Stir: New Signs of Life in Efforts to End Corruption in International Business, 17 J.
PUB. POL'Y & MKTG 108, 109 (1998).
7. See Remarks by Secretary of State Warren Christopher at the Council of the Ameri-
cas Conference, State Dep't Briefing, FED. NEWS SERV., May 6, 1996.
8. Nancy Zucker Boswell, Crackdown on Corruption, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 24, 1998, at
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national Business Transactions (Convention, or Convention on Com-
bating Bribery).9
Pressure continues to mount for countries to support and adopt
extraterritorial antibribery legislation akin to the FCPA.'° This trend
may reflect deference to Western pressures," particularly U.S. efforts
to level the global playing field by encouraging other nations to adopt
a tougher stance on corruption. It may also represent a growing and
heartening global consensus that corruption is dysfunctional and un-
desirable, and therefore in need of stronger controls. 3 In a world that
remains richly heterogeneous, is this growing accord regarding a gen-
eral principle of transactional rectitude enough to justify the adoption
of extraterritorial restraints?
In two previous articles, I have questioned both the wisdom of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in particular, and the logic behind ex-
traterritorial criminalization of bribery in general. In the first article, I
suggested that even the revised FCPA remains so fundamentally
flawed that it causes more harm than it eliminates.' 4 In a follow-up
9. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Busi-
ness Transactions, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1997).
10. See Gilles Trequesser, Inter-American Convention Signed Against Corruption,
REUTERS EUR. Bus. REP., Mar. 29, 1996 (discussing international multilateral antibribery ef-
forts).
11. This scenario is certainly plausible, given the United States' openly aggressive efforts
to foster adoption of FCPA-style legislation throughout the world. See U.S. to Seek Foreign
Acceptance of Anti-Corruption Laws, Practices, 12 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 714, 714 (Apr.
26, 1995) (referring to statement of U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky).
12. Presently, U.S. commentators frequently bemoan the business they lose to companies
from other countries that pay bribes prohibited for U.S. companies by the FCPA. See, e.g., Mary
Mosquera, Foreign Telecom Markets Tough to Penetrate, TECHWEB NEWS, Apr. 1, 1998 ("The
U.S. has more rigorous [antibribery] standards, which puts U.S. companies at a disadvantage.
Our goods can't get through customs, but another distributor['s] can."). This common complaint
is one of the most compelling motivators of U.S. efforts to sell FCPA-style legislation through-
out the world.
At this stage in the movement for multilateral adoption of FCPA-style legislation, some
OECD countries are expressing concern that they will simply be joining the U.S. on the disad-
vantaged side of the unlevel playing field. Since the OECD initiative still leaves most nations
outside the multilateralization movement, some citizen member states of OECD, such as Aus-
tralia, believe they will lose global competitive advantage. See Costello Rejects Business Fears
on Bribery Bill, AAP NEWSFEED, Mar. 31, 1998 (noting belief of spokesperson for the Austra-
lian Chamber of Commerce and Industry that the severity of the FCPA-style penalties will
disadvantage Australian finns).
13. See Joongi Kim & Jong Bum Kim, Cultural Differences in the Crusade Against Inter-
national Bribery: Rice-Cake Expenses in Korea and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 6
PAcIFic RiM LAW & POL'Y J. 549, 551 (1997) (suggesting recent antibribery efforts of organi-
zations like OECD and OAS "represent a growing international consensus that illicit payments
should be eliminated from transnational business").
14. Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229 (1997) [hereinafter Bribery in the
Global Market].
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piece, I argued that global heterogeneity at the end of this millennium
remains so compelling a reality that even the most perfectly formulated
extraterritorial legislation would be crude and unwieldy.'5 The latter
article observes that the "global village" is a work in its earliest stages,
still subject to cultural pluralism in the form of a wide variety of local
values, norms, and beliefs.'6 This heterogeneity taints efforts to pro-
scribe acts of bribery abroad. "7
Focusing primarily on the pragmatic and moral perils of cultural
imperialism, I also alluded very briefly to a "political peril" that arises
from the FCPA.' This peril consists of the added risk of cross-national
hostility that is attributable to officious and overreaching legislation
across national borders.' 9 This article will examine the political hazard
in greater detail, explaining why the proliferation of FCPA-style legis-
lation unjustifiably increases the threat to global harmony.
Section II examines why today's distinctions between acceptable
behavior and bribery remain a cultural construct. Section III suggests it
is imprudent to make subtle moral distinctions extraterritorially under
conditions of cultural heterogeneity. Section IV compares two potential
ways to address global bribery: encouraging the adoption of strong do-
mestic anti-bribery legislation and enforcement through persuasion, and
imposing transnational rule via extraterritorial legislative fiat. Section V
discusses the ways in which the "persuasion for domestic enforcement"
approach can avert the threat of global dissension inherent in the
"extraterritorial legislation" approach. Section VI contains brief con-
cluding remarks.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF BRIBERY
AS A CULTURAL CONSTRUCT
Although some disagree, ° I concede the contention of FCPA sup-
porters that a generic disdain for corruption2' is a universal value,
15. Steven R. Salbu, Extraterritorial Restriction of Bribery: A Premature Evocation of
the Normative Global Village, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 224, 227 (1999) [hereinafter Extraterri-
torial Restriction of Bribery].
16. Id. at 230.
17. Id. at 232.
18. Id. at 227,254.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Michael Reisman, Lining Up: The Microlegal System of Queues, 54 U. CIN.
L. Rav. 417, 447 (1985) (referring to "cultures in which there are no norms against bribery").
21. The word "generic" to qualify a universal disdain for corruption is intended to rec-
ognize the obvious fact that some. persons in any culture will not have a disdain for
corruption (otherwise, corruption would not exist), therefore a society's disdain is a preva-
lent value rather than a ubiquitous one. Despite the existence of some persons in any society
[Vol. 20:419
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
transcending national borders.2 1 Certainly, domestic legislative prohibi-
tions of some form of bribery23 are enacted by many nations across the
globe.2 Even where corruption is a reality firmly ingrained in the social
fabric, 5 widespread participation does not denote approval. Those who
are burdened by endemic corruption may have little choice but to par-
ticipate in a firmly entrenched system of dealings.26 In this setting,
popular resentment accompanies a weary acknowledgment of, and en-
21gagement with, the corrupt system.
Citing this universal condemnation of bribery, some commentators
suggest that the cultural construction of bribery is fallacious.2 1 I would
refine this sentiment, and suggest that while all cultures eschew corrup-
tion, culture remains a critical differentiator as opinions vary on what
conduct falls inside and outside of that label.29 The problem, then, is not
who will not hold bribery in disdain, my contention here is that in all cultures, the dominant
value eschews bribery.
22. See Philip M. Nichols, Outlawing Transnational Bribery Through the World Trade
Organization, 28 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 305, 321-22 (1997) (noting condemnation of cor-
ruption among a wide array of religions and philosophies); Veronica Ann Deberardine,
Comment, Foreign Corrupt Practices: Creating an Exception to the Act of State Doctrine, 34
Am. U. L. REv. 203, 222 n.123 (1984) (noting congressional focus "on a worldwide disdain for
corporate bribery").
23. For discussion of the different ways in which different countries and cultures can
and do circumscribe corruption and bribery, see Salbu, Extraterritorial Restriction of Brib-
ery, supra note 15.
24. See A. Timothy Martin, Corruption and Improper Payments: Global Trends and
Applicable Laws, 36 ALBERTA L. REV. 416, 440-45 (1998) (reviewing laws against improper
payments in Yemen, Libya, Nigeria, Kazakstan, Colombia, Venezuela, Indonesia and Viet-
nam).
25. Bribery, whether explicitly so designated or in the more ambiguous form of gifts
and "consulting fees," is commonplace in some parts of the world. Catherine Reagor, Prepa-
ration Can Help Companies Avoid Most Pitfalls of Exporting: First Step is to Learn
Different Ways, Culture of Targeted Countries, ARIZ. REPUB., May 17, 1998, at A14.
26. See John Hogarth, Developments in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: Bribery of
Officials in Pursuit of Corporate Aims, 6 CRIM. L.F. 557, 562 (1995) (noting that sometimes
"need" rather than "greed" is the motivating factor in the payment of bribes where corrup-
tion is entrenched).
27. For many years, international students in my business ethics classes have made pres-
entations about ethics in their countries. Consistently, when students come from countries where
they view corruption and bribery as fixed or engrained in the culture, presentations take on a
dual personality. The students discuss the woeful conditions with open and harsh criticism, and
they also discuss the realities of surviving in the system. They often tell their peers how to get
along, but none defends the corrupt system. This evidence, while informal and anecdotal, ac-
crues over time to paint a clear picture. The masses may grudgingly participate in corrupt
systems, but this participation should not be confused with approval.
28. See, e.g., Michael A. Almond & Scott D. Syfert, Beyond Compliance: Corruption,
Corporate Responsibility and Ethical Standards in the New Global Economy, 22 N.C. J. INT'L
L. & COM. REG. 389, 429 n.242 (1997) (noting a "false nexus between bribery and culture").
29. Leiken observes that while corruption has long been rejected, "its social and moral
content has evolved." Robert S. Leiken, Controlling the Global Corruption Epidemic, FOR-
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getting the world to agree on whether corruption is morally reprehensi-
ble. The immediate problem is that the world is not ready to agree about
what comprises corruption.0
In other words, while every culture disapproves of certain "reciprocal
exchanges with officials,"'" countries in a highly pluralistic world are un-
likely to agree about which reciprocities are acceptable and which are
not. This problem is compounded by the fact that what constitutes a
reciprocity is itself complex.32 For example, does reciprocity require an
immediate exchange, or does corruption exist simply because the po-
tential for an exchange exists? Is it corrupt for a private party to give a
gift to another with no imminent expectation of any return, when the
gift could plant seeds of unforeseeable reciprocal favor in the future?
Moreover, condemnation of certain behaviors may vary in degree-
some cultures may not censure bribery to the extent that others do.33 The
idealized notion of a "global village" has yet to become a reality. 34 At
the dawn of the twenty-first century, the world is still made up of an
array of communities that embrace a widely divergent range of proto-
cols, norms, values and beliefs."
Defenders of extraterritorial antibribery legislation suggest that the
FCPA respects and accommodates cultural diversity, primarily through
an affirmative defense that exists in the legislation: the legality of a
payment in the country where it is made. Nichols, for example, parries
the cultural imperialism charge against the FCPA by observing that "if a
specific act is not illegal in the country in which it occurs, it cannot be
prosecuted under a law modeled on the Foreign Corrupt Practices
EIGN POL'Y, Winter 1996, 55, 60. Disdain for corruption is easy; defining what qualifies as
corruption along a continuum of activities is much harder.
30. See David A. Gantz, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Professional and Ethical
Challenges for Lawyers, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 97, 102 n.28 (1997) (noting concern
of the Philippines that governments respect the unique traditions and cultures of others in
addressing corruption).
31. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES 692-93 (1984).
32. In this vein, Professor Howell identifies a number of different conceptualizations of
corruption in regard to reciprocity, noting differences in the FCPA, World Bank, and other
definitions of bribery. See Llewellyn D. Howell, Corruption and Crisis in the Global Econ-
omy, USA TODAY (Magazine), May 1998, at 37.
33. See Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Natives, Newcomers and Nativism: A Human
Rights Model For the Twenty-First Century, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1075, 1131 (1996) (positing
situation where political mores of one country are less condemnatory of bribery and self-dealing
than political mores of another).
34. See Salbu, Extraterritorial Restriction of Bribery, supra note 15, at 234.
35. See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Review Essay, Beyond Dworkin's Dominions: Invest-
ments, Memberships, the Tree of Life, and the Abortion Question, 72 TEx. L. REV. 559, 562
(1994). ("In this post-Babel, post-Temple, and pre-Messianic world, we speak different lan-
guages and follow different values.").
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Act.,36 Were this statement true under all circumstances, the cultural
imperialism critique would be weakened.37
The affirmative defense of legality is constrained by statute, such
that many payments that might be lawful in a host country can fall out-
side the defense. Specifically, the affirmative defense permits only those
payments and gifts that are "lawful under the written laws and regula-
tions ' of the :host country." The adjective "written" limits the
affirmative defense solely to those lawful acts in the host country that
are expressly deemed permissible via statute or regulation.39
Ironically, the culture gap between payments banned under the
FCPA and those considered acceptable in another country is very un-
likely to be manifested in written laws. Rather, the permission of certain
practices in other countries will most likely be achieved by omission-
i.e., by leaving the acceptable behaviors out of the written enumeration
of prohibited acts. The legality defense is singularly ill-equipped to ac-
commodate cultural differences. Accordingly, FCPA-style legislation
remains susceptible to charges of exporting morality.4'
In light of these arguments, one might suggest that the FCPA's style
of extraterritorial prohibition can easily be fixed to avert charges of
moral imperialism. The legality affirmative defense could simply be
expanded to include activities that are legal in a host country by default,
in addition to those made legal by express written stipulation.4' This so-
lution would open the affirmative defense up to include a more realistic
set of locally permitted acts within its exemption. The FCPA would
have to defer to local rules regarding bribery in all instances, and not
just in the very unlikely cases where a practice is authorized by a writ-
ten law.
36. Nichols, supra note 22, at 365.
37. While the cultural imperialism critique would be weakened by a truly comprehen-
sive "domestic legality" defense, it would not be eliminated. When the U.S. assesses
activities that occur in other nations under the justification that the actions are illegal under
those nations' domestic laws, it presumes to interpret (1) the activity, and (2) the foreign
domestic law. These can be intrusive acts, particularly given that local institutions have been
established to handle the problem internally. For further discussion, see infra notes 68-71
and accompanying text.
38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(c), 78dd-2(c) (1994).
39. See H. Lowell Brown, Parent-Subsidiary Liability Under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 50 BAYLOR L. REv. 1, 7 n.19 (1998) (explaining the received interpretation of
the legality defense).
40. See Lisa Harriman Randall, Note, Multilateralization of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 657, 673 (1997) ("Some observers maintain that to require
American businesses to adhere to the FCPA in their overseas operation is to 'export our moral-
ity.' ").
41. Philip. M. Nichols, Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of Globalization and
Fragmentation, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 257, 288 (1999) [hereinafter Regulating Transnational
Bribery].
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Although this solution may have theoretical appeal, it is unlikely to
eliminate or even significantly reduce moral imperialism in the real
world. Consider what would happen under the FCPA if the legality af-
firmative defense were purportedly strengthened by eliminating the
written law requirement. When pursuing cases under the FCPA, the
United States would be required to read the bribery laws that exist in the
host country and determine what specific practices those laws permit,
either in express writing or by omission. Understanding a nation's laws,
even with the benefit of social, legal and cultural familiarity, is a suffi-
ciently daunting task. 2 Interpreting what conduct is prohibited and what
is permitted in hundreds of other legal systems will be immeasurably
more difficult.43 Unfortunately, this process is burdened with the sub-
stantial risk of overstepping appropriate boundaries.
When U.S. prosecutors try to determine whether a behavior is ex-
empt under the legality defense, they must at very least read the host
country's law, and interpret the nuances of language, once roughly
translated. Each of these steps provides an opportunity to impose U.S.
values on another land.
A. Reading the Host Country's Law
Even if the legality defense were to include practices that are lawful
by omission (i.e., acts not explicitly proscribed), law enforcement offi-
cials still would be required to read the written laws of other countries.
They would need to understand the scope of an express legislative pro-
scription to determine exactly what acts are lawful in the host country.
Reading a host country's law is often a difficult task' that raises "the
formidable challenge of linguistic and cultural translation. ' This proc-
ess is fraught with occasions for both the exercise of judgment and the
commission of error.46
42. For example, commentators observe that U.S. companies have a difficult time inter-
preting the FCPA, a U.S. statute. See, e.g., Randall, supra note 40, at 672 (observing the
difficulties businesses face in interpreting provisions of FCPA).
43. See Note, Unification and Certainty: The United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1984, 1993 n.57 (1984) (" '[P]arties
understand each other better, on the whole, than they understand each other's legal sys-
tems. ") (quoting Berman, Excuse for Nonperformance in the Light of Contract Practices in
International Trade, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1438 (1963)).
44. See Peter W. Schroth, Legal Translation, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 47 (1986 Supp.) (noting
the difficulties of legal translation).
45. See Francis H. Foster, Parental Law, Harmful Speech, and the Development of Le-
gal Culture: Russian Judicial Chamber Discourse and Narrative, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
923, 937 (1997).
46. For example, Britt notes a "varying quality" in the translations of foreign statutes.
Robert R. Britt, The Japanese Legal System and International Trade: Up-to-Date Sources of
[Vol. 20:419
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Consider the case in which a word in original language A can have
any of three different meanings in language B. Choosing the translation
that most accurately represents the host country's intent requires an in-
timacy with the country's culture and social systems, its legal system
specifically, the region's history, the legislation's history, etc.47 U.S.
prosecutors, in their efforts to pursue violators aggressively, may either
subjectively opt for the translation most favorable to their allegations, or
objectively choose a translation option that fails to capture the host
country's intent. Whether authorities charged with executing the extra-
territorial law are overzealous or simply subject to normal human error,
the very process of translation is unavoidably tainted with a potential for
inaccuracy. 8 Of course, defense attorneys will be subject to the same
dynamics, as will the U.S. judges who must ultimately apply the foreign
laws. The result is a great likelihood of inaccurate translations and mis-
understandings of other nations' laws.49
These observations apply, albeit probably to a lesser degree, even
when the host country and the country imposing extraterritorial legisla-
tion therein share a common language. ° Two nations sharing the same
language remain two separate countries; the contextual meaning of
words, phrases and idioms have developed independently.5' For
Information in English, 82 LAw LIBR. J. 313, 317 (1990). See also Nancy J. Linck & John E.
McGarry, Patent Procurement and Enforcement in Japan-A Trade Barrier, 27 GEO. WASH.
J. INT'L L. & EcON. 411, 415 (1993-94) (noting the high frequency of translation errors
from English to Japanese in the filing of patent applications in Japan).
47. See Janet E. Ainsworth, Categories and Culture: On the "Rectification of Names"
in Comparative Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 19, 26 (1996) ("In any language, individual
words bear not only their primary meanings but also layers of nuance, slowly built up as a
result of the historical context in which the word has been used in the culture.").
48. See Andrew N. Adler, Translating and Interpreting Foreign Statutes, 19 .MIcH. J.
INT'L L. 37, 45 (1997) (describing difficulties anglophone judges experience with statutory
translations, and noting the "glaring translation errors" that occasionally occur in cases as a
result).
49. One can argue that the adversary system in the U.S. will assist judges to apply accu-
rate translations of foreign laws. Certainly, the job of prosecutors and defenders is to present
any conflicting translations that best support their cases. Two problems remain, however: (1)
How are judges to choose the better translation, assuming a fundamental unfamiliarity with
the law, society, and culture of the host country?; and (2) Does judges' special, heightened
reliance on advocates to present translations hinder accuracy and fairness in applying foreign
laws? Arguably, the judges' pronounced dependency on attorneys' proffered explanations in
this arena could magnify the effects of the advocates' talents, aptitudes, and preparation on
case outcomes.
50. As Weyrauch observes, "[t]o the extent that language mirrors cultural expectations,
distortions of meaning may occur within the same language." Walter 0. Weyrauch, Oral Legal
Traditions of Gypsies and Some American Equivalents, 45 Am. J. CoMp. L. 407, 427 n.65
(1997).
51. See Adler, supra note 48, at 48 (discussing the "high incidence of false similarities
in legal vocabulary" among countries that share a common language).
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instance, the meaning of an English word in the U.S. can have a some-
what or entirely different meaning in Australia, as the legal, social,
political, economic and other structures in these two distinct and distant
places52 may have developed separately. 3
B. Interpreting the Nuances of Language of the Host Country's Law,
Once Roughly Translated
Suppose that the enforcers of an extraterritorial law correctly trans-
late the law within the meaning of the preceding subsection. In other
words, when reading the host's law and translating it into their own lan-
guage, they routinely choose the most precise of several translation
meanings. This optimal accuracy of translation54 does not, unfortunately,
guarantee successful interpretation of the language.
Another dimension of meaning remains. Within the best possible
translation of a word or set of words, or within one language in cases
where no translation is necessary,55 precise meanings must be derived
through the inherently, inadequate processes56 of, interpretation and con-
struction." In the business contexts frequently associated with bribery,
discrepancies in the understanding of precise meanings even within a
single language may result from differences in interpreters' "commercial
subculture [s].",5
52. Obviously, geographic distance increasingly plays a smaller role in fostering both cul-
tural and linguistic isolation, as globe-spanning technology such as satellite transmission of
television programs brings the world closer together. Nonetheless, national differences in a
common language remain, and geography continues to play some role in regional distinctions.
53. This phenomenon is true as well within a country, particularly a large country such as
the United States, where the meaning of language certainly can vary regionally. Recognition of
and respect for these differences support the authority of states in our federalist system.
54. I speak of optimal rather than perfect accuracy of translation, since perfect translation
is simply impossible. As cultural constructs, different languages reflect different kinds of
meanings and even entirely different concepts that might not even exist across cultures. For
discussion of these and related translation realities, see Foster, supra note 45, at 990-91.
55. These would be cases, obviously, where the host country and the interpreting country
share the same official language.
56. For discussion of the inevitable failure of precision in interpretation, see Jeffrey
Malkan, Literary Formalism, Legal Formalism, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1393, 1399 (1998).
57. The need for interpretation and construction to hone precise meanings is a product
of linguistic vagueness and indistinctness. Words that have generic definitions may also have
more specific variations, such that "those who speak the same language do not always use
[these words] in the same sense." THOMAS REID, ESSAYS ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS OF
MAN 475 (MIT Press 1969) (1813).
58. Gloria M. Sanchez, A Paradigm Shift in Legal Education: Preparing Law Students
for the Twenty-First Century: Teaching Foreign Law, Culture, and Legal Language of the
Major U.S. American Trading Partners, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 635, 664 (1997). ;
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This problem, already challenging when faced in one's own legal
system, can be extremely troublesome in a foreign one.5 9 Consider here
the subtle distinctions in what is meant by bribery among different peo-
ple in different cultures, using the closest translational concept for the
English word "bribery" that exists in a host country's language. 60 Inter-
preting other nations' precise definition of the word, particularly in
regard to categorizing various practices as either bribery or not bribery,
is daunting to the point of approaching folly.
6
'
A bribe to some is a harmless gratuity to others.62 It may represent
an expression of gratitude, appreciation, or loyalty; a display of eti-
quette; a form of entertainment condoned by local protocol; a socially
expected form of post-transactional celebration between transactors; a
legitimate compensation for expenses incurred; a necessary facilitator or
expediter for services; a symbolic message conveying understanding of
another's needs; or an acceptable token of nominal value.63 Even when
the interpreter correctly identifies the closest translational meaning of a
word, its precise application cannot help but vary across cultures and
languages. Accordingly, even extraterritorial applications relying on the
most accurate possible translations will tend to fall within cultural and
linguistic gaps.'
59. See Michael B. Shulman, Note, No Hablo Inglks: Court Interpretation as a Major
Obstacle to Fairness for Non-English Speaking Defendants, 46 VAND. L. REv. 175, 186
(1993) (calling foreign language construction "one of the most difficult tasks a human being
can perform," and noting the inevitability of mistakes even among the most experienced and
competent interpreters).
60. Words that may refer to bribery in another language or culture may not be an exact
translation. See, e.g., John Linarelli, Anglo-American Jurisprudence and Latin America, 20
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 50, 72 (1996) (referring to Brazilian concept of "jeito," or a way to
"bend or evade legal rules," which can include not only what we consider bribes, but other
behaviors that evade rule of law).
61. Consider, for example, the Korean notion of "ttokkap," which can refer to either
traditional, socially acceptable payment of rice cakes as a form of hospitality, or the less
acceptable improper payments to government officials in exchange for favors. Kim & Kim,
supra note 13, at 561-62.
62. See Salbu, Extraterritorial Restriction of Bribery, supra note 15, at 235.
63. See id. at 234-50. A reader may be tempted to develop a taxonomy in which all of
the above practices can be placed logically either within or outside of an optimal proscrip-
tion of bribery. I would applaud the effort, which could provide a start toward clarifying
some of the many ambiguities that remain in the coverage of the FCPA in its present incar-
nation. What such an effort will not and can not do, however, is ameliorate the problems
associated with broadly translating, and then more subtly interpreting, the word most closely
approximating "bribery" in another country and another language. The problem is that a
disparity will remain between that country's conceptualization and the reader's idealized
conceptualization. Even if the latter is exemplary, it cannot be used to interpret the laws of
the host nation without warping or damaging the real meaning of those laws.
64. For discussion of cross-linguistic and cross-cultural translation challenges generally,
see Steven R. Salbu, Parental Coordination and Conflict in International Joint Ventures:
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III. THE IMPRUDENCE OF MAKING SUBTLE MORALITY DISTINCTIONS
EXTRATERRITORIALLY UNDER CONDITIONS
OF CULTURAL HETEROGENEITY
Ultimately, many gray areas in business ethics need to be resolved
by edict of law." Drawing lines distinguishing acceptable and unaccept-
able behavior may be precarious and may even threaten unjust results at
the cut-off point. 6 Ordinarily, society accepts this as an unavoidable
61price of establishing order over complex problems. Yet the arbitrary
line-drawing that may be acceptable domestically, under conditions of
relative cultural homogeneity, can become unacceptable when applied
extraterritorially, under conditions of relative cultural heterogeneity.68
The Use of Contract to Address Legal, Linguistic, and Cultural Concerns, 43 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 1221, 1240-58 (1993).
65. Arbitrary, legal line-drawing indeed pervades the world of business ethics. Lines are
drawn to circumscribe unacceptable conflicts of interest, deceptive trade practices, and un-
fair employment practices, to name just a few examples. Given that the law routinely does
and must classify complex behaviors that actually have mixed or ambiguous motives, my
argument is not with the line-drawing process itself. Rather, my objection extends to arbi-
trary line-drawing in settings where the decision-maker is likely to misunderstand the values
he or she attempts to implement.
66. The difficulty in making fine distinctions between unacceptable bribes and accept-
able gifts is best illustrated by looking at a wide spectrum of behaviors that are extremely
resistant to facile classification. Let us start at the extreme: a lavish gift given on condition
that the giver receive a lucrative government contract is blatantly morally troublesome. A
moderate gift given to a potential buyer without any stated expectations occupies a position
of moral uncertainty: the ethical status of such a gift depends largely on the giver's expecta-
tions regarding how it will and should be received-i.e., with or without any sense of
reciprocal indebtedness. Finally, a small token of nominal value, given to a social host who
also is a potential buyer, would seem to be among the more innocuous gratuities that can be
presented in any likely business setting. Yet even this last payment, which could easily fall
under the rubric of "loyalty" and "appreciation," is far from morally unambiguous. When-
ever the giver might possibly receive any selective benefit from the recipient, the ethical
posture of the gift is at least suspect. See Jan Hoth Uzzo, Recent Decision, Federal Prosecu-
tion of Local Political Corruption Under the Hobbs Act: The Second Circuit Attempts to
Define Inducement, 51 BROOK. L. REV. 734, 761 n.142 (1985) (noting while some gift-giving
is innocuous, other gift-giving creates the expectation that a favor will be returned).
67. Both nations and companies frequently draw arbitrary lines distinguishing between
acceptable and unacceptable gifts. The capriciousness of antibribery initiatives explains at least
part of the resistance they meet in some locations. According to one report, the recent antibrib-
ery efforts in Japan are meeting some resistance. In a country where gift-giving is ingrained in
the culture, restrictions on things like gifts, outings, and dinners are seen by some as arbitrary
restraints. See Financial Scandals Renew Focus on Bureaucratic Power (Part 2), JEI REP., Mar.
6, 1998. Despite the inevitable resistance that will exist in times of transition, and particularly in
regard to arbitrary initiatives, it is important to note that Japan's recent domestic anti-bribery
stance is a significant change. For further discussion, see infra notes 146-49 and accompanying
text.
68. The best-intended efforts to curb bribery around the world cannot presently be
translated into extraterritorial legislation like the FCPA without trampling on transnational
social and cultural pluralism. This truth is magnified in importance by the difficulties that a
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We may be able to accept the law's crude classification of lawful and
unlawful activities when the governed group shares a strong bond of
common values and norms.69 It is harder to accept the bifurcation of le-
gal versus illegal activities, inevitably blurry at the margin, when the
arbitrary lines apply to other countries that function under fundamen-
tally different belief systems that we may understand poorly.
Consider how this general principle applies to the specific problem
of bribery. It may be possible to differentiate domestically, with due
deference to cultural idiosyncrasies regarding acceptable and unaccept-
able gift-giving. For example, Woodward observes that Indonesians
have been able to make distinctions "between their traditional practice
of giving gifts to express loyalty and :appreciation, and the traditional
extortion practiced by some bureaucrats who exploit this generous
trait."70 If they are to be both fair and meaningful, such theoretical dis-
tinctions should be grounded in a common understanding.' Outside this
context, distinctions occupy an inherently and unavoidably shady area.
Within this culturally bound ambiguity, the subtle gradations of accept-
able business practices with regard to gratuities, favors and gifts are a
nation faces, even internally and without the added concern of massive cultural variance,
when it attempts to draw lines among subtly differentiated cases. According to one com-
mentator, distinguishing "unacceptable bribes from acceptable gifts" in Australia and New
Zealand has become one of the area's "subtler ethical dilemmas." John Milton-Smith, Busi-
ness Ethics in Australia and New Zealand, 16 J. Bus. ETICS 1485, 1489 (1997). Once the
effort shifts from a national to a transnational level, this challenge is only exacerbated by
national and cultural heterogeneity.
69. In today's pluralistic societies, is it realistic to suggest that inhabitants of a nation
share values and norms, any more than inhabitants of different nations do? While the char-
acteristic of common values and norms obviously is relative, as a general rule one would
expect people within one nation to form more culturally cohesive groups than people living
in different nations. The former group shares a greater number of naturally developing af-
finities, through common descent, intermarriage, and greater incidence of religious and
ethnic commonality. They also share, to some degree or another, a developing national cul-
ture.
Davis emphasizes the special importance of local culture and society in another context-
constitutionalism-in terms of "indigenization." See Michael C. Davis, Constitutionalism and
Political Culture: The Debate Over Human Rights and Asian Values, 11 HARV. HuM. RTS. J.
109, 138 (1998) (noting importance of respect for "local cultural concerns" and the "local
social condition" in the development of governing institutions). Consistent with this idea,
one can argue persuasively that a culture indigenous to a geographically specific locale has a
special and unique strength.
70. Donna K. Woodward, Foreigners Fathered Rl's Graft, JAKARTA POST, Dec. 17, 1997,
at 4.
71. When extraterritorial decision-makers render judgments without an intimate under-
standing of the cultural context, results are more likely to be meaningless and unfair due to a
schism between law and ethics. While the outsider certainly can impose order, the outsider's
inadequate understanding of cultural value subtleties increases the chances that the legal
decision imposed will clash with received local norms and values. The result is a rule of law
that fails to reflect the dominant value system of the nation in which it is being enforced.
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potential mine field for legislators seeking to exert their influence ex-
traterritorially.
Consider the bank that says acceptable gifts may cost no more than
fifty dollars.7 Do bank officials believe that presents worth this maxi-
mum cannot have a corrupting effect on executive decision-making? If
they do, one can argue persuasively that they are wrong. While such a
modest gift is unlikely to yield gross miscarriages of sound executive
judgment, it certainly can generate sufficient good will to tip the scales
when stakes are moderate.73 In all likelihood, bank officials realize this,
but consider their regard for etiquette and protocol to outweigh very
modest negative effects on objectivity.
This reasonable accommodation between cultural norms and ethical
ideals must ultimately draw an arbitrary line. The fact that fifty dollars
is probably as good a value as any to draw that distinction does not
change the fact that it is indeed arbitrary,74 and that the line itself ac-
knowledges that gift-giving practices can serve legitimate social and
cultural functions, even when gift-giving technically could corrupt deci-
sion-making.75 Under these conditions, where different reasonable
72. See Banker's '£1m Bribe' From Bus Firm's Sell-Out, EVENING STD. (London), June
17, 1997, at 16 (discussing policy of First National Bank of Boston in regard to alleged one
million pound bribe).
73. For example, a government procurement decision-maker might have to choose be-
tween two relatively comparable suppliers. The decision-maker might err in favor of the
supplier who has conferred even a nominal, relatively valueless gift simply because of the good
feelings the decision-maker has toward this supplier for the gesture made. Subversion of the
pristine evaluatory process could take any number of forms. For example, the decision-maker
might assess the gift-giver as slightly superior to the non-gift-giver, despite an objective parity
of qualification, because the bestowing of the gift has clouded the decision-maker's evaluative
capabilities. Or if the decision-maker's evaluative abilities are unimpaired by the gift, the deci-
sion-maker could nonetheless use the good will engendered by the gift as a tie breaker. This
phenomenon could be blatant or latent-the decision-maker may or may not realize that the
enhanced comfort level in the relationship with the gift-giver is a function of the gift-giving. In
either instance, the gift can skew the decision-makers' judgment.
74. The arbitrariness of the line is demonstrated by a consideration of hypothetical cases.
In Case 1, a $49 gift that is permitted under the policy may actually change a bureaucrat's or an
executive's decision. In Case 2, a $51 gift that is prohibited under the policy might have had no
effect on a bureaucrat's or an executive's decision. This inconsistency can exist for any number
of reasons. One reason is that gifts of virtually the same value will have different effects on
different decision-makers. This allows for two types of errors-i.e., the error of outlawing a gift
that would have no corrupt impact, and the error of permitting a gift that does have a corrupt
impact. These types of errors highlight the arbitrariness of picking a cut-off figure for acceptable
gifts.
75. These legitimate social and cultural functions may not outweigh the ethical problems
associated with corrupted decision-making. They do suggest, however, that the evaluation of
gift-giving is complex-gift-giving in business contexts cannot simply be viewed as purely evil.
The complexity demands that assessors of the process of gift-giving understand social and cul-
tural functions from within before they can judge their value and enter that value into any
utilitarian calculus.
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judgment calls can be made by different companies and different gov-
ernments, it is dangerous for any country to try to impose its judgment
on others.
IV. EXTRATERRITORIAL LEGISLATION VERSUS PERSUASION
Potential host country resentment of extraterritorially applied legis-
lation is hardly debatable. The imposition of influence and control
across borders is an undeniable source of transnational tension and
strife.76 However, corruption's undesirable effect on world markets is
also indisputable. 7  Just as intrusive legislation poses a threat to global
peace, rampant bribery in the post-Cold War era potentially under-
mines world order, particularly as it harms struggling nations," where
fair and efficient economic development is critically important.0 Thus,
we are left to determine whether the medicine of multilateralized FCPA-
style legislation provides the best cure to an admittedly deadly disease.
The FCPA and other such extraterritorial legislation8' are unneces-
sarily harsh and intrusive treatments for bribery. Political, social, and
76. See Penny Zagalis, Recent Decision, Hartford Fire Insurance Company v. Califor-
nia: Reassessing the Application of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
241, 267 (1994) (noting "unmitigated hostility" to U.S. law applied abroad) (citation omit-
ted).
77. Among the costs of bribery are the subversion of transactions, the impairment of
foreign direct investment, the distortion of relative prices, and the reduction of gross domes-
tic product and, therefore, of living conditions. See Nichols, Regulating Transnational
Bribery, supra note 41, at 275-76.
78. See Philip M. Nichols, Corruption in the World Trade Organization: Discerning the
Limits of the World Trade Organization's Authority, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 711, 712
(1996) ("The end of the Cold War, the creation of fledgling market systems, the hastened
pace of globalization and economic integration, and a number of other factors have led to an
increase in the perceived amount of corruption activity in both local and global commerce.").
79. See Charles S. Saphos, Essay, Something Is Rotten in the State of Affairs Between
Nations: The Difficulties of Establishing the Rule of International Criminal Law Because of
Public Corruption, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1947, 1947 (1996) (quoting President Clinton:
"[a]s the cold war gives way to the global village, too many people remain vulnerable to
poverty, disease ... ethnic and religious hatred, the reckless aggression of rogue states, ter-
rorism, organized crime, drug trafficking and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.").
80. In particular, developing nations and nations in transition from communist to capi-
talist markets cannot afford bribery's impairment of free-market efficiencies. See Salbu,
supra note 14, at 252-53.
81. The analysis contained in the remainder of this article will address at least three
possible closely related phenomena-the FCPA, the legislation that Congress ultimately
passes to revise the FCPA in order to comply with the Convention, and all extraterritorially
applied anti-bribery legislation generally. While particular observations may relate to one of
these three phenomena, all observations are intended to apply to the most generic of the
classes, i.e., extraterritorially applied anti-bribery legislation in general. All the comments
made about the more specific classes apply to the generic category as well.
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economic pressures are powerful, persuasive tools in modern, informa-
tion-intensive society." Increased accessibility to information makes it
harder to hide and to ignore the world's spotlight.83 Contemporary
global media such as CNN Worldwide expose newsworthy activities to
global scrutiny,"4 rendering businesses increasingly accountable for their
actions even in the absence of legally-imposed accountability. Trans-
parency will necessarily increase in this context,85 providing a strong
impetus for the internal, domestic treatment of infractions. These forces
of persuasion address the problem of bribery without threatening trans-
border overreaching.
An example illustrates the superiority of persuasion and the inap-
propriateness of extraterritorially applied legislation. Consider Russia's
emerging capitalist markets, in which bribery and corruption are gener-
ally considered to be pervasive and destructive forces.86 Puffer and
McCarthy describe the current Russian climate in the throes of rapid
change:
Russia's turbulent history has been characterized by oppressive
political regimes that have created confusion about the role and
importance of business in Russian society, as well as conflicting
standards of ethical business behavior. This history, coupled
with the recent turmoil created by the move toward a market
economy, has created ambiguity among business people about
what constitutes ethical behavior. 7
Within this general framework of moral ambiguity, Mahoney de-
scribes the Russian climate regarding corruption in particular:
82. See Edith Brown Weiss, International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues
and the Emergence of a New World Order, 81 GEO. L.J. 675, 709 (1993) (noting that today's
information technologies can be used to influence disparate groups and constituencies).
83. For discussion of the impact of open, accessible information technologies on an in-
formed citizenry, see Peter Seipel, The Technology of Insight: Computers and Informed
Citizens, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 417 (1993).
84. See Martin, supra note 24, at 439-40 (citing the proliferation of global communica-
tions such as CNN as a source of increased worldwide dissatisfaction in regard to
corruption).
85. See Thomas Cottier, The Impact of New Technologies on Multilateral Trade Regu-
lation and Governance, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 415, 434 (1996) (noting "technology-driven
pressure to open... processes").
86. See Helen Womack, Corruption "Corroding" Russia, INDEPENDENT (London), Feb.
13, 1993, at 10 (describing government corruption as existing throughout the Russian state
structure).
87. Sheila M. Puffer & Daniel J. McCarthy, Business Ethics in a Transforming Econ-
omy: Applying the Integrative Social Contracts Theory to Russia, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON.
L. 1281, 1285 (1997).
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The bribery required as a condition of doing normal business
may be due to explicit demands or expectations. It may more
subtly result from an inherently unjust market characterized by
inequality of access and unfairness in distribution, as has been
alleged with regard to modern Russia, where trying to work
within such an unethical system can justify taking counter-
measures which would not otherwise be ethically acceptable.88
A difficult moral question arises in this context. Suppose for a mo-
ment that a particular payment is not prohibited by Russia's written
laws. Suppose also that this payment would be considered a bribe under
U.S. law. Is it ethical for a U.S. businessperson to make the payment in
Russia under the conditions stated in the above quotations? While de-
ontological principles may suggest it is not, 9 a utilitarian calculus might
indicate the contrary.
How might this utilitarian argument be made? In a number of
"endemically corrupt countries" throughout the world, bribery is so en-
trenched that outsiders have only two real choices-to pay bribes, or to
avoid doing business entirely.90 If Russia is such a country, an outsider
might determine that participating in the system causes more harm than
good, and therefore decide to stay out.9' Another person might reason
that the benefits of opening previously closed markets, and the opportu-
nity to effect change through active engagement rather than avoidance,
operate in favor of entry.92
88. Jack Mahoney, Ethical Attitudes to Bribery and Extortion, in Boo B.
SCHLEGELMILCH, MARKETING ETHiCS: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 283, 290 (1998).
89. For example, one can argue in favor of a Kantian categorical imperative that makes
payments to government officials unethical under all circumstances.
90. See David Pallister, No Sweeteners Added: Britain's Bribery Culture is Coming Under
Attack From International Initiatives, GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 17, 1998, at 20 (noting that
businesspersons, banks, and government in Britain condone bribery that is "the only way to
proceed" in numerous countries).
91. This scenario indeed seems to play out in the real world, as some companies decide
against foreign investment in countries where corruption is entrenched. See Peter Daniel
DiPaola, Note, The Criminal Time Bomb: An Examination of the Effect of the Russian Mafiya
on the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
145, 164 (1996) (noting some U.S. businesses' hesitancy to invest in Russia because of en-
demic corruption there).
92. The ."active engagement" approach is most familiar to us through the historic con-
troversies surrounding U.S. and global responses to apartheid in South Africa. Of course, the
active engagement arguments against trade bans eventually were rejected by the U.S. in
regard to South Africa, so it is difficult to assess the active engagement approach of chang-
ing host country cultures from within. The concept of active engagement in the more general
sense of healthy discussion and debate is frequently mentioned in the literature. See, e.g.,
Linda C. McClain, Toleration, Autonomy, and Governmental Promotion of Good Lives:
Beyond "Empty" Toleration to Toleration as Respect, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 19, 130 (1998)
(noting relationship between citizens' active engagement and shifting conceptions of ethics).
Spring 1999]
Michigan Journal of International Law
Moreover, a utilitarian calculus can distinguish among different
patterns of bribe-paying. Consider the payment of many bribes that are
substantial, and undermine critically important decisions. Then consider
the payment of a small number of bribes that are insignificant, and un-
dermine only trivial decisions. Engaging in the greater magnitude of
bribery might be too weighty a price to pay for participation in, and at-
tempts toward reform of, the Russian market. Conversely, engaging in
the lesser magnitude of bribery arguably could be justified by the posi-
tive changes one might bring to the host country's economy and
politics.93
Which choice the reader would make is immaterial to the purposes
of this discussion. What is relevant is that extraterritorial antibribery
legislation may prohibit a U.S. actor from making a difficult ethical
choice under conditions where the behavior being considered does not
violate local laws.94 The American actor with years of experience in the
host country may have a finely honed understanding of local culture and
extenuating circumstances. 95 This understanding might persuade her to
make what she would consider to be unacceptable payments in most
96other contexts. Her judgment may lead to more beneficent results than
the blind application of extraterritorial legislation.
In this and other instances, countries around the world would be far
more prudent to adopt the light-handed expedients of colloquy and per-
suasion. The relative subtlety of this approach does not imply that
efforts will be weak; rather, it suggests that they should be respectful of
93. Canada's policy of maintaining open trade relations with Cuba is an example of a
policy of active engagement, aimed at bringing change through continued interaction and
discussion with Cuba, which differs from the U.S. policy of imposing sanctions. See David
S. DeFalco, Comment, The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act Of
1996: Is the United States Reaching Too Far?, 3 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 125, 142 n.106
(1997) (contrasting Canada's efforts to bring change to Cuba through dialogue and active
engagement with the United States' isolationist policy). While a particular reader may prefer
one policy over the other, reasonable utilitarian arguments can be made in support of either.
94. In previous writings, I have argued that legally imposed conceptions of right and
wrong under conditions where reasonable minds can differ entail an impoverished notion of
ethics. Steven R. Salbu, Law and Conformity, Ethics and Conflict: The Trouble With Law-
Based Conceptions of Ethics, 68 IND. L.J. 101, 131 (1992). The imposition of a rule of law
upon the decision-maker in the hypothetical at hand provides an example of this thesis.
95. See Terry W. Schackmann, Reflections in a Rock Garden: A Civic Commitment to
International Understanding?, 42 KAN. L. REv. 531, 540 (1994) (noting value of "perspectives
gained from living and working at length in foreign countries, experience essential to advis-
ing in foreign transactions").
96. See Martin Davis, Just (Don't) Do It: Ethics and International Trade, 21 MEL-
BOURNE U.L. REv. 601, 614 (1997) ("If... we are genuinely satisfied that the practice is
both morally acceptable in the foreign country and that it does not have any victims, then we
may make the payment.").
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autonomy and sovereignty of the nations around the world that are
working toward a unified goal in a diversity of settings.
V. AVOIDING ETHNOCENTRISM AND CONCOMITANT GLOBAL
DISSENSION: SELLING DOMESTIC CONTROLS
IN THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
This section suggests that there are two important benefits to ad-
dressing the issue of bribery using persuasive rather than intrusive
measures. First, persuading the world's nations to adopt and vigorously
implement effective domestic antibribery laws avoids legitimate charges
of ethnocentrism. Second, persuasion is less likely to create global dis-
sension than coercive, extraterritorially applied laws.
A. Avoiding Legitimate Charges of Ethnocentrism
Increasingly, nations around the world share the United States' goal
of fighting the economic dysfunction associated with bribery.97 With due
deference to sovereignty and autonomy, OAS and OECD nations and
others concerned about bribery can make a compelling case in favor of
relatively noninvasive domestic (rather than FCPA-style extraterritorial)
anti-bribery legislation, combined with rigorous domestic enforcement.
Domestic controls are a realistic, workable option for the future. As we
shall observe in greater detail later,98 Japan has recently accelerated its
movement towards more stringent domestic anti-bribery initiatives99 in
the wake of perceptions that corruption contributes to its recent eco-
nomic woes."'° Nations concerned with the moral climate and the
economic health of their markets can and should be persuaded to adopt
domestic antibribery laws within their own borders. As each new coun-
try works in this direction, the goals of reducing global corruption are
furthered, but without the intrusiveness and insensitivity to subtle cul-
tural distinctions evinced by the FCPA and its impending imitators.'°'
Consider the analysis of information collected recently from United
Nations member states, noting "an increasing awareness by govern-
ments of the need to instill and nurture, through administrative and
97. For discussion of the costs of bribery, see Almond & Syfert, supra note 28, at 434-35.
98. See infra notes 145-48, and accompanying text.
99. See Yasumasa Shimizu, Bribery Scandals Generate Ethics Bills, Opposition Measures
Calls For Strict Rules, Stiff Penalties For Bureaucracy While Ruling Coalition Trails in Effort,
NIKKEI WKLY., Mar. 23, 1998, at 4.
100. Id.
101. Domestic anti-bribery laws are relatively unintrusive because they are enacted and
applied by the host country to behaviors within its own borders.
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legislative initiatives, a culture of legality, accountability and transpar-
ency. ' 2 The analysis emphasizes the development of "a shared
understanding that action against corruption can be effective only when
there is a concrete and continuous synergy between all actors involved
at both the national and international levels."' °3
Depending on how they are interpreted, these statements can sup-
port either extraterritorial or exclusively domestic legislation. How
groups like the United Nations implement their observations will be
critically important as the world tries to fight corruption, while remain-
ing sensitive to cultural pluralism and considerations of sovereignty and
autonomy. On one hand, the above comments appear to recognize the
importance of colloquy and persuasion across borders, given their em-
phasis on instilling and nurturing the values of accountability and
transparency. On the other hand, efforts toward "concrete and continu-
ous synergy" could lead to overstepping. If the achievement of a
concrete transnational synergy relies upon extraterritorial edict, then we
approach an otherwise laudable goal with a directedness that is prema-
ture, because it precedes an underlying threshold-level global value
104
consensus.
In other words, a critical question regarding transnational bribery is
whether payments made outside the United States should be identified,
analyzed and evaluated by U.S. courts and judges under U.S. law, or
rather by officials within the host countries in which the payments were
made. It remains dangerous for one country to enforce its values in an-
other country, even when the enforcing country feels confident that it is
proposing righteous standards.'
Of course, the impulse to enforce morality through extraterritorial
application of law may be grounded in both good intentions and sound
thinking. For example, the recent backlash against moral relativism
102. Commission on Crime Prevention, Criminal Justice, to Meet at Vienna, 21-30 April,
M2 PRESSWIRE, Apr. 22, 1998.
103. Id.
104. Accordingly, global resentments toward extraterritorially applied laws generally,
and those of the U.S. specifically, are not a new phenomenon peculiar to the FCPA. For
discussion of earlier resentments over extraterritorial legislation, see Barry E. Hawk, Inter-
national Antitrust Policy and the 1982 Acts: The Continuing Need for Reassessment, 51
FORDHAM L. REV. 201, 238-39 (1992).
105. The rhetoric of selling the FCPA frequently employs the idea of requiring the rest
of the world to adopt the U.S.'s already high anti-bribery standards. For example, Senator
Feingold alludes, in support of the Convention on Combating Bribery, to the "high standards
Senator Proxmire established" in outlawing bribery through the FCPA. Senator Russ Fein-
gold, Feingold Urges Swift Senate Action on Anti-Bribery Treaty, CONG. PRESS RELEASES,
June 9, 1998. While such references may imply the existence of an objectively optimal or at
least superior set of standards, valuation of standards becomes difficult, as well as subject to
cultural determination, in borderline or fuzzy area cases.
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indicates popular support for a single, defensible ethical system.' °6 Espe-
cially at the extremes of human behavior, it is appropriate and necessary
to demand that moral mandates transcend cultural boundaries and dif-
ferences. 7 Nazi atrocities of World War II cannot be excused under the
theory that right and wrong are cultural artifacts, or that those outside
the system cannot judge the system because they are imposing a subjec-
tivity in their assessments.
Beyond these extremes, however, ethical relativism continues to en-
courage intercultural respect where distinctions between right and
wrong are less clear.108 This observation is a product of two factors, con-
sidered in combination. First, cultural anthropologists tell us that
variations across cultures are pervasive-"that there are virtually no
aspects of culture that are common to all human societies."' 9 Second,
while some moral mandates can be said to transcend culture, a far
greater number do not." Transcendent moral mandates include only the
most fundamental of imperatives. The moral duty not to murder' can
be classified persuasively as universal. The larger class of nontranscen-
dent values can and should be defined by agreement, under arrangements
of social contract.' 2 Respect for the pluralism identified by cultural
106. See Richard Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 1637, 1642-43 (1998) (eschewing "moral subjectivism" and the "'vulgar relativism' that
teaches, self-contradictorily, that we have a moral duty to tolerate cultures that have moral
views different from ours .... ).
107. See Bobby Jindal, Relativism, Neutrality and Transcendentalism: Beyond Auton-
omy, 57 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1278 (1997) ("Objective morality, which transcends the particulars
of any given situation or society, allows the minority to criticize atrocities .... ).
108. See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash of
Cultures or a Clash With a Construct?, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 307, 383 (1994) (observing that
while the relativist position can be flawed, it does reflect "sensitivity to and respect for cul-
tural differences," and avoids ethnocentricity).
109. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST 33 (1995) (citing CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETA-
TION OF CULTURES 34-35 (1973)).
110. Moses brought back a scant ten commandments, and even some of these are contro-
versial. Moreover, they do not cover most situations. Consider the manager who must decide
whether to relocate a plant abroad. There is no universal moral mandate to apply; rather, man-
agers facing this decision must weigh effects, such as impact on current employees, impact on
local and foreign economies, effects on profits and therefore on shareholders, etc. Likewise, a
boss who must evaluate an employee can be brutally honest, or can temper the assessment with
a degree of diplomacy that detracts from the total honesty of the evaluation. Which is the mor-
ally superior approach? While many people may believe there is a clear answer, others will
disagree. Most ethical decisions are akin to these two examples in that a number of different but
reasonably defensible approaches can be adopted.
111. See CLIFFORD CHRISTIANS & MICHAEL TRABER, COMMUNICATION ETHICS AND
UNIVERSAL VALUES 72 (1997) (discussing taboo against unjustifiable homicide as univer-
sal).
112. See Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Toward a Unified Conception of
Business Ethics: Integrative Social Contracts Theory, 19 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 252, 260-62
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anthropologists suggests that ethical relativism is and should be alive
and well, at least within the large sphere of operations in which values
can be defensibly labeled social constructs, not categorical impera-
tives."3 Within this framework, encouraging nations to adopt and
implement their own domestic antibribery laws is the solution to cor-
ruption most respectful of legitimate cultural differences.
B. Avoiding Global Dissension
The overreaching of extraterritorial legislation can affect world re-
lations. The 1990s critique of relativism. 4 has the potential to empower
a resurgence of moral imperialism. Peter Drucker identifies this trend as
a new ethics that "denies to business the adaptation to cultural mores
which has always been considered a moral duty in the traditional ap-
proach to ethics."" 5
History tells us that nations around the world highly value control
over their own political processes." 6 At best, they will resist extraterrito-
rially imposed legislation that is perceived as imperialistic."7 At worst,
the encroachments such legislation represents can engender the same
kinds of international hostility and conflicts caused by physical inva-
sion.
Pfaff accurately casts some United States efforts toward global eco-
nomic transformation as imperialistic." 8 He asserts, "[t]he United States,
ambivalently backed by Europe and Canada, is attempting to force the
replacement of crucial economic and social institutions in the non-
Western world with institutions drawn from its own experience and that
of Western Europe.""' 9 While critiques that cast modern U.S. economic
(1994) (discussing conditions under which ethics can be derived legitimately through social
contracts).
113. Deference to cultural delineations of ethics in the vast realm of discretionary areas is
captured in Fukuyama's definition of culture as "inherited ethical habit." Fukuyama cites moral
inventions such as the uncleanliness of pork in Judaism and primogeniture in Japan to illustrate
the cultural definition of many ethical precepts. FUKUYAMA, supra note 109, at 34.
114. See supra note 106.
115. See Peter Drucker, Business Ethics, in ROBERT C. SOLOMON, THE NEW WORLD OF
BUSINESS: ETHICS AND FREE ENTERPRISE IN THE GLOBAL 1990s 323 (1994).
116. See Douglas Michael Ely, Note, The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine and the Peti-
tioning of Foreign Governments, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1360 (1984) (observing a "foreign
sovereign's strong stake in its own political process").
117. See Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Export Administration Act of 1979
Under International and American Law, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1308, 1318 n.58 (1983) ("Past
assertions by the United States of extraterritorial jurisdiction have led to legislation in other
countries designed to block what these countries believe to be violations of international law
and infringements of territorial sovereignty.").
118. William Pfaff, A New Imperialism?, COMMONWEAL, Mar. 13, 1998, at 6.
119. Id.
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policy as the colonialism of the 1990s"2° may be dramatic, they also
contain a prudent warning, reminding nations with expansionist histo-
ries that the world resents and fights their encroachment. While "[tihe
new Western offensive means no damage . .. it is a war of society and
culture, and causes damage ... [that] has political consequences."''
The vernacular of Senator Jesse Helms in regard to the Convention
on Combating Bribery captures an attitude U.S. interests adopt all too
often in the debate over corruption. In Helms' own words, there is "a
need to push-and I use that word advisedly-to push our European
allies and other countries to enact laws that criminalize bribery of for-
eign officials b , their citizens overseas."' 22 The comment is telling in
two ways-it evokes a tradition of aggressive, forceful U.S. demands
that the world resolve problems in the U.S-endorsed manner, and it rein-
forces the idea that "[t]he only right way is our way-the way we do it
in the United States."'2 In view of Helms' comments and similar state-
ments, it is little wonder that both the FCPA and aggressive U.S.
measures to bring other countries in line with the statute's philosophy
have met with resistance and resentment.
Few would challenge the idea that physical aggression and expan-
sionism endanger global harmony. A greater number of observers would
question the idea that forcefulness in promoting public policies bears
similar kinds of risks. Yet Alterman accurately observes that global
hostilities toward U.S. imperialism are not limited to military foreign
relations issues, but encompass economic encroachments as well.'
25
"Growing resentment of U.S. heavy-handedness is hardly limited to
Europe, the Gulf, or even military matters," he notes, adding that, "[i]n
Asia, resentment is growing at U.S.-directed demands that nations like
Indonesia and South Korea open up their societies to U.S.-style capital-
ism. ' ' 116 He concludes that many Asians see "a U.S. attempt to use their
temporary weakness to impart a new form of what Thai newspapers are
calling 'U.S. financial imperialism' and 'economic colonialism' in the
region."'27
120. Id.
121. Id. at 7.
122. Ben Barber, Helms Vows Quick Action on Anti-Bribery Treaty, WASH. TIMES, June
10, 1998, at A16.
123. Thomas J. Vernados & Mei Lin Fung, Ethics: Ho-Hum? Or, Gotcha!, J. MGMT
CONSULTING, May 1998, at 51.
124. See Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market, supra note 14, at 278 & n.316.
125. Eric Alterman, We Are the World, NATION, Mar. 9, 1998, at 4.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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Thus, while much of the world resented perceived U.S. political im-
perialism during the Cold War, nations are now likely to resent U.S.
economic imperialism.' The resentment will be exacerbated when na-
tions fear that their culture is at risk of being supplanted by U.S.
culture.' 9 Moreover, other nations' sensitivity regarding U.S. economic
intrusiveness has become aggravated over the past few years. Europe is
increasingly uneasy with U.S. world influence,'30 and Canada has insti-
tuted "blocking measures" that "insulate Canadian nationals and
companies from foreign attempts to enforce their extraterritorial re-
quirements or penalize their violation."'' Meanwhile, turmoil in Asia's
economy has triggered a backlash there against U.S. influence in global
economic affairs.12 According to Kawachi,
Those who feel victimized by post-cold war trends regard eco-
nomic globalization as a campaign to impose Western values,
under which a country's development strategy and reform ef-
forts are judged by how close they approach the Anglo-
American model. Among these people there are rising concerns
that, unless something is done, their own cultures and even
value systems will be swallowed up by foreign norms."'
To what degree such resentments are justified is an interesting
question. In itself, however, its answer cannot resolve the policy issues
surrounding extraterritorial statutes. Justified or not, resentment over
128. Modern resentment of economic imperialism, focusing specifically on extraterrito-
rial application of U.S. laws, dates back at least to the 1980s, in regard to antitrust
legislation. See Gary E. Dyal, Comment, The Canada-United States Memorandum of Under-
standing Regarding Application of National Antitrust Law: New Guidelines for Resolution of
Multinational Antitrust Enforcement Disputes, 6 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1065, 1065 (1984-
85) ("The extraterritorial enforcement of United States antitrust law against Canadian busi-
nesses has been a source of continual conflict between these two nations.").
More recent concerns focus on the Helms-Burton Act and the Iran and Libya Sanctions
Act. For discussion of these extraterritorial legislative sanctions, see J. Brett Busby, Note,
Jurisdiction to Limit Third-Country Interaction With Sanctioned States: The Iran and Libya
Sanctions and Helms-Burton Acts, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 621 (1998).
129. See, e.g., David Ivanovich, To Canada, Free Trade Isn't Trouble-Free, Hous.
CHRON., Nov. 7, 1997, at Bus. I (quoting Ron Wyatt, a staff representative of U.S. Steel-
workers of America in Canada: "There's a fear of our culture being swallowed up by the
American culture.... We're fearful of losing our uniqueness.").
130. Richard Whittle, Nations Resent Preeminence of U.S., DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Dec. 29, 1997, at IJ.
131. Peter L. Fitzgerald, Pierre Goes Online: Blacklisting and Secondary Boycotts in
U.S. Trade Policy, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 60, 62 (1998).
132. Takashi Kawachi, A New Backlash Against American Influence, JAPAN ECHO, Apr.
1998, at 44.
133. Id. at 45.
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legislative overreaching has historically engendered hostility, '34 poten-
tially threatening diplomatic relations between nations."' This hostility
in turn has created a hazard to international relations, and may even
pose a threat to global peace. In a world where U.S. flags are burned in
demonstrations against alleged U.S. arrogance and hegemony, ' any
perception of an overweening megalith has the potential to fuel back-
lash "'37 and create an atmosphere of conflict, acts of retributive terrorism,
and even war.
Of course, the degree of harm engendered by invasive laws will
vary and will be difficult to predict under a range of circumstances.
Goldsmith and Rinne attribute "withdrawal of foreign investment,
blocking of corporate acquisitions and mergers, and damage to foreign
relations" to extraterritorial application of laws.'38 Zimmerman accu-
rately notes, "[ft]he more intrusive the application [of an extraterritorial
statute], the more the United States exposes itself to international criti-
cism and retaliation."'
139
Clearly, world order is threatened by acts of aggression, whether
physical or ideological. Particularly in regard to ideological aggression
and multilateralization of extraterritorial antibribery legislation, two
questions remain. First, is it possible that multilateralization of the
FCPA may in fact reduce perceptions of legal and cultural imperialism
in conjunction with the United States? Second, are stepped-up world-
wide domestic laws and implementation really capable of addressing the
unwieldy problem of transnational bribery?
134. See Michael Elliott, Going Home: People and Nations Have a Sense of Identity,
Which Could Fuel a Growing Resentment of America, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 30, 1996, at 38
(noting that the rest of the world looks upon the U.S. as an "aggressive bully," and that
American hegemony packaged as globalization is engendering a growth in anti-American
sentiments).
135. See Zagalis, supra note 76, at 267 (observing that extraterritorially applied U.S.
antitrust laws "threaten diplomatic relations between the United States and other nations").
136. See Drusilla Menaker, Iraq Standoff Fueling Anti-American Feeling in Mideast,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 28, 1998, at 12A.
137. See Mark E. Zelek, Book Review, 14 COMP. LABOR L,. 514, 517 (1993) (reviewing
JAMES MICHAEL ZIMMERMAN: Extraterritorial Employment Standards of the United States:
The Regulation of the Overseas Workplace (1992)) (noting "the imposition of extraterritorial
standards may be viewed by foreign countries as uninvited interference," which historically
has "resulted in retaliation and embarrassing diplomatic protest in the foreign public policy
arena").
138. Michael Goldsmith & Vicki Rinne, Civil RICO, Foreign Defendants and "ET," 73
MINN. L. REV. 1023, 1027 (1989).
139. James M. Zimmerman, International Dimension of U.S. Fair Employment Laws:
Protection or Interference?, 131 INT'L LABOUR REV. 217, 230 (1992).
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1. Whether Multilateralization of the FCPA May Reduce Perceptions
of U.S. Legal and Cultural Imperialism
Sources suggesting that overreaching threatens diplomatic stability
typically focus on U.S. legislative intrusions and international resent-
ment directed toward the "ugly Americans." One might argue that
multilateralization of the FCPA will take some heat off the United
States. Other countries might serve as new lightning rods to receive
some of the criticism historically lodged exclusively against the United
States. Moreover, as more countries create extraterritorial legislation,
they will have joined the U.S. camp and cannot criticize our legislative
posture without also criticizing their own.
While these observations are probably accurate, their veracity will
not save multilateralization of the FCPA from being diplomatically di-
visive. The citations in this section, evoked to highlight the problems of
legislative overreaching, focus on the U.S. simply because we are per-
ceived as the most aggressive nation in the world in our legal
encroachments.'4 ° Given this fact, the literature in U.S. international law
journals will naturally focus predominantly on U.S. cultural and legal
imperialism.
Moreover, multilateralization will not take the heat off the U.S.; in-
stead, it will dramatically expand the potential for discord and conflict.
This is true for several reasons. In the short run, only thirty-four nations
have agreed, at least in theory,'4' to adopt legislation in compliance with
the Convention on Combating Bribery. 42 How many or how few will
follow, and over what span of time, is impossible to predict. It is, how-
ever, highly unlikely that all the world's nations will join the present
effort, as it is unlikely that the world's nations will ever act collectively.
This is especially true given the reservations many nations have enunci-
140. See, e.g., Robert D. Shank, Note, The Justice Department's Recent Antitrust En-
forcement Policy: Toward a "Positive Comity" Solution to International Competition
Problems?, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 155, 160 n.18 (1996) (noting the U.S. "has tradition-
ally been the most aggressive nation exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction in antitrust
cases").
141. The potential slip between the Convention signatories' initial manifestations of
concurrence, and actual implementation of the legislation that will be required by the Con-
vention, is very real. Indeed, even the United States, which already has in place the only
legislation that comes close to the Convention's requirements, is experiencing impediments
to the necessary legislative emendation at the time of writing. These impediments have
evoked concerns that the Convention initiative could be delayed or derailed if the U.S. can-
not pass appropriate laws expeditiously. See Nancy Dunne, Last-Minute Moves on Bribery
Pact, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1998, at 4 (describing trouble in Congress passing the legislation
needed to comply with the Convention, and quoting Transparency International- USA Chair-
man Fritz Heimann: "Failure by Congress to pass implementing legislation would be
regarded as a ready excuse for inaction.").
142. See supra note 8.
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ated regarding extraterritorial laws in the post-Cold War era.' 43 Multilat-
eral efforts will not make global adoption of FCPA-style legislation
unanimous. The logical result will be an increased application of extra-
territorial law in countries that themselves decline to pass
extraterritorial legislation. This dynamic is unlikely to reduce tensions.
Even if it does reduce tensions against the U.S. specifically, it would
only focus attention on other nations perceived to have become unac-
ceptably aggressive. Again, this shift is unlikely to benefit global
relations.
Now suppose that all countries did indeed adopt extraterritorial leg-
islation prohibiting the bribery of foreign officials. Unanimity of
approach would hardly guarantee that the rampant reaching into trans-
actions across borders would remain peaceable. To the contrary,
regardless of how many countries eventually sign on to the present
multilateralization efforts, the attempts of one sovereign to moderate
activity within the borders of another will always pose the risk of disa-
greements, resentments, and conflict. ' 4 Should all the world's nations
enact extraterritorial anti-bribery legislation, the result will increase the
pool of potential international relations mine fields. As every country
adjudicates right and wrong in the complex social landscapes of its
neighbors, we may wistfully reminisce about the days when peace was
measured by how well each nation minded its own business.
2. Whether Domestic Laws Are Capable of Addressing
the Problem of Transnational Bribery
While extraterritorially applied legislation may be heavy-handed,
one can argue that it is necessary if global corruption is to be expunged.
This underestimates the power of persuasion, light-handed diplomacy
and dialogue in the information era. As Boswell notes, "we are wit-
nessing the growth of a free press and investigative journalism as well
as more open political competition, more independent judiciaries and
prosecutors, and a coming of age of civil society as a political force de-
manding accountability from those who govern.
' 4
The scenario under which countries aggressively attack bribery do-
mestically is not unrealistic. As the critical discussion of corruption
mounts worldwide, we are beginning to see nations that have tolerated
corruption in the past addressing the problem in unprecedented ways.
Consider an incident in Japan, where a rich tradition of gift-giving has
143. See supra notes 116-139 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 76.
145. Nancy Zucker Boswell, An Emerging Consensus on Controlling Corruption, 18 U.
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1165, 1168 (1997).
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begun to evoke concerns regarding bribery and corruption.'4 6 Recently,
an "excessive entertainment" scandal rocked the nation, as the Bank of
Japan penalized nearly one hundred of its officers for ostentatious en-
tertainment of government officials. 147  Finance Minister Hikaru
Matsunaga likewise punished over one hundred government officials for
accepting excessive entertainment from insurance companies, banks,
and brokerage companies.
4
1
To what can we attribute unprecedented corporate and government
responses to bribery in Japan? It was spurred by the collapse of one of
Japan's largest brokerage houses in November of 1997, and backlash
against "a network of over-familiar relationships between important
bureaucrats and the corporate entities they supposedly regulated ..." 9
Japan's recent hard line on bribery is a domestically fashioned solution
to a problem of admittedly global proportions. At the end of the millen-
nium, no nation can miss the clear and highly publicized conclusion that
corruption is economically devastating. 50 The message will travel only
more quickly as the information technologies of the next century spread
throughout the world.'5 '
Consider as well the "sweeping anti-corruption policy" recently
adopted by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), aimed at increasing
the accountability and transparency of public institutional transactions
throughout the continent.' The regional initiative was spurred by an
ADB study demonstrating economic inefficiencies associated with brib-
ery, inefficiencies so severe that losses attributable to corruption
sometimes exceed a country's foreign debt.'53 Awareness of the devas-
tating costs of bribery and corruption are more than sufficient incentive
to spur local and regional reforms. The self-interests of the nations of
the world provide strong impetus for internal change, and we see such
change occur as word spreads.
146. See Sonni Efron, Gift-Giving Tradition Abruptly Ends in Japan, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
26, 1996, at A12 (discussing how recent scandals have chilled "the traditional custom of
businesses sending posh year-end gifts to their regulators").
147. Jonathan Watts & Dan Atkinson, Sayonara to Sake, Sushi and Geisha Sleaze,
GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 28, 1998, at 21.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. For a catalog of the ways in which corruption devastates economically, see Robert
H. Sutton, Note, Controlling Corruption Through Collective Means: Advocating the Inter-
American Convention Against Corruption, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1427, 1437-40 (1997).
151. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
152. P.T. Bangsberg, Corruption Cleanup Will Level Playing Field for Contractors, J.
COM., Aug. 5, 1998, at IC.
153. See id.
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While some gray-area cultural distinctions regarding acceptable and
unacceptable specific behaviors will linger in the foreseeable future, we
can expect the global debate to escalate, and consensus on the broader
principles concerning bribery and corruption to gel over the long run.
For now, imposition of extraterritorial fiat is unnecessarily harsh and
invasive. The resentment it engenders threatens global harmony, and
could even encourage resistance to domestic corruption reforms that
might be more easily embraced under less aggressive conditions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The world is too culturally diverse to accept the external imposition
of laws without resentment. 1 4 Under these conditions, extraterritorial
legal fiat is at the very least insulting and distasteful.'55 Transnational
relations likely will be strained by the overreaching of any one nation
into the affairs conducted within the borders of another.'56 As one com-
mentator suggests, other nations "may perceive the FCPA as a culturally
arrogant encroachment on their ability to govern activities exclusively
within their own borders, in accordance with international law princi-
ples on territorial sovereignty."''57
While the risk of being perceived as obnoxious and intrusive is
hardly insignificant, it pales when compared with a more serious risk-
the increased likelihood that transnational relations will become
strained,'58 and that nationalistic sentiments will flourish in response to
154. For comparison, consider treaties through which signatories all agree to mutually ac-
cepted conditions and terms that apply only to the signatories themselves. Within these bounds,
no laws are being applied extraterritorially without the consent of the local sovereignty. In con-
trast, FCPA-style legislation, now to be adopted in dozens of countries, restricts behavior even
in non-signatory nations that have not consented to the intrusion.
155. See Meredith Poznanski Cook,' Note, The Extraterritorial Application of Title VII:
Does the Foreign Compulsion Defense Work?, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 133, 149
(1996) (labeling aspects of the extraterritorial application of U.S. employment laws as arrogant);
Henry H. Rossbacher & Tracy W. Young, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Within the
American Response to Domestic Corruption, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 509, 526 (1997) (observing
that critics label FCPA "cultural imperialism").
156. See Muriel van den Berg, Comment, The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
Act: Violations of International Law and the Response of Key American Trade Partners, 21 MD.
J. INT'L L. & TRADE 279, 306 (1997) (referring to "climate of hostility towards extraterritorial
American laws").
157. Kenneth U. Surjadinata, Comment, Revisiting Corrupt Practices from a Market
Perspective, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1021, 1026 (1998).
158. Applications from our history in other areas of the law are instructive here. See, e.g.,
John Byron Sandage, Note, Forum Non Conveniens and the Extraterritorial Application of
Antitrust Law, 94 YALE L.J. 1693, 1693 (1985) ("Expansive extraterritorial application of
United States antitrust law has precipitated a political crisis with America's major trading part-
ners.").
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the perceived invasiveness of the extraterritorially applied laws. 5 9 The
results of this scenario can range from mounting hostilities over other
issues to the severance of trade,' 60 and potentially even to military con-
frontation. Thus, van den Berg observes that extraterritorial
application of the Helms-Burton Act in Canada has fueled an
"international perception of the United States not only as a cultural im-
perialist but as a growing legal imperialist."' 62 Perhaps more threatening
to the delicate global diplomatic balance, the reach of the Helms-Burton
Act has sparked an unforeseen and undesirable alliance between Canada
and Cuba, 163 in effect undermining U.S. efforts to apply economic sanc-
tion pressures in the latter. Simply stated, laws resented for their
overreaching nature can be counterproductive.
Van Wezel Stone identifies similar risks in another area where ex-
traterritorial law has been posited as a possible global solution-
international labor regulation.'" She notes that because extraterritorial
jurisdiction does not aspire to be integrative, it fails to contribute to a
common international system of norms and standards.' 65 Instead, extra-
territorial jurisdiction tends to undermine international peace and
cooperation by creating tension and destabilizing international rela-
tions.'" Sovereign nations "react with intense hostility when... activities
within their own borders are made the subject of investigation by a for-
eign nation applying foreign rules and procedures.' 67
159. See Y. Kurt Chang, Comment, Special 301 and Taiwan: A Case Study of Protecting
United States Intellectual Property in Foreign Countries, 15 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 206, 223
(1994) (attributing arousal of nationalistic reactions to one country's imposition of its laws on
another).
160. See June Cohan Lazar, Protecting Ideas and Ideals: Copyright Law in the People's
Republic of China, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1185, 1190 (1996) (noting aggressive U.S.
protection of copyright interests in China nearly resulted in a trade war in early 1995).
161. The potential for hostilities over extraterritorial legislation to escalate to the point of
military confrontation is a logical possibility, rather than a trend in recent history. Indeed, even
U.S. antitrust law, the extraterritorial application of which has evoked substantial retaliatory
reaction, has not led to this extreme. See William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-
Laws Theory: An Argument For Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 101, 165 (1998)
(noting that while extraterritoriality of U.S. antitrust law has evoked blocking statutes and claw-
back statutes, it has not caused the cessation of international cooperation). While we have yet to
see hostilities over U.S. extraterritorial legislation escalate to the point of war, the potential for
such a scenario can never be ruled out.
162. Van den Berg, supra note 156, at 314.
163. See id. at 306-07.
164. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Global Economy: Four Approaches to
Transnational Labor Regulation, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 987 (1995).
165. See id. at 1026.
166. See id.
167. Id.
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The world is not sufficiently homogenized to embrace one concep-
tualization of morality in gray areas, '68 andattempts to force a unified fit
via extraterritorial legislation are likely to spark ill will and retaliation.'69
Such hostilities can result, of course, whenever one country imposes its
rule upon transactions that occur in another country. The potential is
increased when vague laws are applied to the ambiguous conditions of
markets in transition, such as communist economies that are in the
process of converting to capitalist ones. 70 This suggests a danger in ex-
ternally-based efforts to unify legal structures addressing such moral
issues. Must we therefore throw up our hands in despair, and abandon
all exertions to extirpate bribery and corruption? The answer is decid-
edly no. Abdication of responsibility to improve global markets would
be as irresponsible as overweening intrusion into the affairs of other
nations. The appropriate middle ground between complacency and inva-
siveness is persuasion.
168. Gray areas are unavoidable both in the assessment of bribery generally and under
the FCPA in particular. For example, while it is reasonable to exempt so-called "grease pay-
ments" from criminal sanctions, a partner at Arthur Anderson describes classification of
grease payments as "a very gray area, the most difficult for lawyers and/or accountants to
opine on." Elizabeth V. Mooney, Bribery Norm in Foreign Markets Poses Legal Challenge
for U.S. Firms, RADIO COMM. REP. (Int'l ed.), Mar. 30, 1998, at 26.
169. See Sandage, supra note 158, at 1693 (attributing political crisis and retaliatory
legislation to "[e]xpansive extraterritorial application of United States antitrust law").
170. See Christopher F. Dugan & Vladimir Lechtman, The FCPA in Russia and Other
Former Communist Countries, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 378 ( ) (describing ambiguities in the ap-
plication of the FCPA to various situations in newly opening markets of previously
communist countries).
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